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ABSTRACT
Data revisions and the availability of a longer sample offer the opportunity to reconsider the
empirical  findings  that  suggest  that  in  the  OECD  countries  national  saving  responds
non-monotonically to fiscal policy. The paper confirms that the circumstance most likely to give rise
to a non-monotonic response of national saving to a fiscal impulse is a "large and persistent
impulse", defined as one in which the full employment surplus, as a percent of potential output,
changes  by  at  least  1.5  percentage  points  per  year  over  a  two-year  period.  This  particular
circumstance remains the only statistically significant one even when we allow for non-monotonic
responses to arise when public debt is growing rapidly or interest rate spreads are widening. We find
that non-monotonic responses are similar for fiscal contractions and expansions. In particular, an
increase in net taxes has no effect on national saving during large fiscal contractions or expansions.
For government consumption there is a large, albeit in some specifications less then complete, offset



























ITALY  1 
1. Introduction  
 
The idea that fiscal consolidation can bear fruit in the short term is controversial. Not long ago, 
the Financial Times described the situation very well: “In one corner we have the political left, 
armed with a multiplier, and in the other we have the right, armed with a Laffer curve. The left 
insists that increased public spending boosts output via demand — the famous multiplier effect. 
The right asserts that tax cuts and curbs on public spending stimulate private sector effort via 
supply.” 
 
Commenting on this remark in the FT, Rodrigo de Rato, the Managing Director of the IMF, 
appropriately observed that the subject is much more complicated than that: “It is true that the 
starting point should be the standard Keynesian tenet that fiscal adjustment is contractionary. 
However, some  years ago, in a surprising departure from this orthodox stance, Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) pointed to Denmark and Ireland in the 1980s as examples of expansionary fiscal 
contractions, as their respective fiscal adjustments were followed immediately by an increase in 
growth.  Their  explanation  was  firmly  rooted  in  the  tradition  of  the  turnaround  in  rational 
expectations. The argument is that a decisive policy for reducing both the fiscal deficit and high 





The possibility that fiscal contractions may be a source of economic growth immediately 
attracts those who doubt the effectiveness of traditional Keynesian fiscal policies, arguing that 
many empirical studies have shown the limited magnitude of fiscal multipliers, and point to many 
instances, above all in the case of Japan, where the response of the economy to a fiscal expansion 
has  been  weak  or  non-existent.  But  how  common  are  expansionary  fiscal  contractions,  or 
contractionary expansions, and when do they occur? This question has induced many institutions, 
including the IMF, the OECD and the European Commission, to take a closer look at episodes, in 
particular of expansionary fiscal contractions. 
 
In previous work, we search for the circumstances in which the private sector response to 
fiscal policy impulses is non-monotonic (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990 and 1996; Giavazzi, Pagano 
and Jappelli, 2000, GJP from now on). The results drawn from the experience of OECD countries 
show that a non-monotonic response is more likely to arise when fiscal impulses are large and 
persistent and that non-monotonic effects are larger and more precisely estimated for changes in 
net taxes than for changes in public consumption. 
 
In this paper we reconsider, extend and update the evidence analyzed in GJP. There are 
several reasons to extend and update our previous results. First of all, the data used in GJP ended 
in 1996. Eight more years of data have since become available, and these include several new 
episodes of fiscal contractions and expansions: among them the fiscal contractions in Europe to 
meet the Maastricht criteria in the run-up to EMU and the subsequent fiscal expansions in 2000-
02; the Japanese fiscal expansion that lasted through most of the 1990s; the U.S. fiscal expansion 
                                                 
1 “Benefits of Fiscal Consolidation”, remarks by Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo to the Real Academia de Doctores 
Barcelona, Spain, November 25, 2004.   2 
during the first Bush administration. By extending the sample, we are able to increase from 109 
to 128 the number of episodes characterized by a “large and persistent fiscal impulse”, defined in 
GJP as one in which the full employment surplus, as a percent of potential output, changes by at 
least 1.5 percentage points per year over a two-year period. The updated sample includes 5 more 
“large and persistent” contractions and 14 more “large and persistent” expansions with respect to 
GJP. 
 
Secondly, since GJP was written, the OECD has revised backwards some of the relevant 
series. In particular its measure of the cyclically adjusted primary budget surplus has changed 
significantly, as the correlation between the old and the new series between 1970 to 1996, the 
original sample, is 0.874. Some of the episodes of large and persistent fiscal impulse considered 
in GJP have thus disappeared from the sample, replaced by  a few new ones. The series for 
potential output has also been revised, as have other variables. It is thus interesting in itself to 
check whether the original results survive when using the revised data. 
 
Finally, we check the robustness of the results by allowing for a different source of non-
monotonic response of national savings to fiscal impulses: the possible role of the risk premium 
on  government  bonds  —  either  exchange  rate  risk  premium  or  default  risk.  This  channel  is 
suggested by the findings in Ardagna (2004) and by models of debt default (Blanchard, 1990) 
and liquidity (Caballero and Krisnhamurty, 2004). 
 
Our findings suggest, in a nutshell, that the hypothesis of a non-monotonic response of 
national savings to fiscal impulses is confirmed in the updated and revised OECD dataset. They 
also  confirm  that  the  circumstance  most  likely  to  give  rise  to  a  non-monotonic  response  of 
national  saving  is  a  “large  and  persistent  fiscal  impulse”,  defined  as  one  in  which  the  full 
employment surplus, as a percent of potential output, changes by at least 1.5 percentage points 
per year over a two-year period. On the other hand, fiscal impulses that are “relatively small” 
tend to be associated with Keynesian effects. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We survey the relevant literature in Section 2, 
present the data in Section 3, report the econometric estimates in Section 4 and summarize the 
results in Section 5. 
 
 
2. What have we learnt from the analysis of large fiscal adjustments ? 
 
A recent study by the European Commission covering 14 EU countries in the period 1970-2002 
finds  that  roughly  half  of  the  49  episodes  of  fiscal  consolidation  they  identify,  have  been 
followed by an acceleration in growth (Giudice et al., 2003). This result is robust with respect to 
the  criteria  used  to  identify  the  consolidation  episodes  and  to  classify  such  episodes  as 
expansionary.  Using  the  Commission’s  macroeconomic  model  (QUEST)  to  understand  the 
mechanisms that could give rise to an output expansion, they conclude that the source of non-
Keynesian effects mostly lies in the response of private consumption to expected future income.    3 
Similar work at the Central Bank of Poland (Rzonca and Cizkowicz, 2005) looks at seven 
episodes of strong fiscal adjustment (in this case both expansions and contractions) that occurred 
since the mid-90’s in eight new EU member countries: Estonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Latvia,  Lithuania,  Poland,  the  Slovak  Republic  and  Slovenia.  The  paper  finds  evidence  that 
discretionary fiscal consolidation “contributes substantially to the acceleration of output growth 
even in the short run”, but is unable to identify unambiguously the channels through which non-
Keynesian effects occur. 
 
The IMF has also looked at the effects of large fiscal consolidations — measured as a 
cumulative primary fiscal adjustment of more than 5 percent of GDP — and concluded that they 
appear  to  be  associated  quite  frequently  with  a  positive  macroeconomic  response  (Martinez, 
2004). The study covers more than 160 countries in the last 30 years and identifies 155 episodes 
of large fiscal adjustment. About 40 percent of these episodes were linked to an upturn in short-
term growth — although it is once again difficult to identify the likely sources of the observed 
output expansion. 
 
Work at the OECD has examined the extent to which fiscal policy actions may be offset by 
simultaneous, anticipatory changes in private saving, as well as the determinants of that offset 
(De Mello et al, 2004). Based on a sample of 21 OECD countries spanning the period 1970-2002, 
the study finds strong evidence of partial, yet substantial, offsetting movements in private saving. 
The overall offset is estimated at between about one-third and one-half, depending on model 
specification,  and  applies  both  to  public  consumption  and  to  shifts  in  tax  revenue.  The 
magnitudes  of  these  estimated  offsets  suggest  that,  in  response  to  a  fiscal  tightening  of 
approximately 5 per cent of GDP - comparable to that of the OECD area as a whole during the 
upturn that occurred between 1993- and 2000 — private saving is expected to fall by about 2½ 
per  cent  of  GDP  over  the  period.  The  effect  on  national  saving  of  a  fiscal  easing  of  this 
magnitude is therefore of a rise of about 2½ per cent of GDP, other things equal. The saving 
offset appears to be greater over the longer term, with changes in fiscal stance being almost 
totally offset by changes in private saving, leaving national saving largely unaffected. 
 
As for the conditions under which such effects are more likely to occur, the OECD paper 
finds that: (i) private saving offsets appear to have been somewhat lower at higher levels of 
indebtedness; (ii) the revenue/expenditure composition of the fiscal shift matters for the private 
saving offset; (iii) private saving appears to respond in relatively equal proportion to changes in 
current revenue and expenditure, but public investment does not elicit an offsetting response of 
saving. 
 
Investigating the response of consumers to a fiscal impulse, Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) 
find that private consumption appears to respond in a non-monotonic way to fiscal impulses. 
Their  results  suggest  that  such  non-monotonic  effects  tend  to  be  associated  with  large  and 
persistent  fiscal  impulses,  and  appear  to  be  stronger  for  fiscal  contractions  than  for  fiscal 
expansions.2 While in normal times an increase in net taxes (that is, taxes net of government 
                                                 
2 There are several explanations for such non-monotonic effects. Spending cuts or tax increases can produce an 
increase in private consumption only if they raise the market value of non-human wealth or consumers’ perception of   4 
transfers)  tends  to  depress  consumption,  during  large  fiscal  contractions  the  effect  on 
consumption of an increase in net taxes is not statistically different from zero. For government 
spending they find that an increase (a cut) in public spending stimulates (lowers) consumption in 
normal times, but reduces (raises) it during a large fiscal impulse. 
 
GJP (Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano 2000) also study the response of consumers to a fiscal 
impulse, but from a slightly different angle, that is looking at the effects of fiscal policy on 
national savings. This allows them to interpret the results with reference to the predictions of 
Ricardian equivalence. As is well known, models with infinite horizons imply that (for a given 
level of government spending) taxes and transfers have no effect on national saving; that is, the 
Ricardian proposition holds. On the other hand, the standard overlapping generations model with 
finite horizon predicts that an increase in taxes (or a reduction in transfers) raises national saving. 
But the sign and size of the effect of fiscal policy on national saving might also depend on the 
level and sustainability of government debt, on the size and persistence of the fiscal impulse, or 
on  the  change  in  composition  of  the  budget.  In  some  situations  (for  instance  in  the  model 
described in Blanchard, 1990) an increase in net taxes may even produce a decline in national 
saving, by generating a boom in private consumption. 
 
GJP search systematically for the circumstances in which national saving responds non-
monotonically to fiscal policy impulses, using two dataset, one which includes OECD countries, 
another which looks instead at emerging market economies. The results drawn from the OECD 
sample show that a non-monotonic response of national saving is more likely to arise when fiscal 
impulses are large and persistent and that non-monotonic effects on national saving are larger and 
more  precisely  estimated  for  changes  in  net  taxes  than  for  changes  in  public  consumption. 
Furthermore,  non-monotonic  effects  also  appear  to  be  asymmetric,  and  stronger  and  more 
precisely estimated for fiscal contractions than for fiscal expansions; in particular, during large 
fiscal contractions an increase in net taxes has little or no effect on national saving. They also 
find  that  a  rapidly  growing  public  debt  is  not,  per  se,  a  good  predictor  of  non-monotonic 
responses. 
 
These findings about the effect of the size and composition of the fiscal impulse are not 
entirely  consistent  with  those  found  in  other  studies.  Alesina  and  Perotti  (1995,  1997)  and 
Alesina and Ardagna (1998) find that the private sector response is larger if the budget is cut by 
slashing public sector wages and reducing social security benefits, rather than by raising taxes 
and cutting public investment. Along the same lines, Ardagna (2004) finds that fiscal adjustments 
effected by government spending cuts and generating a permanent and substantial decrease in 
government debt are associated with larger reductions in interest rates and increases in stock 
market prices — thus suggesting that the increase in the market value of non-human wealth is the 
channel through which such fiscal impulses raise output growth. Perotti (1999) finds that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
their permanent income. Changes in permanent income depend on expectations. A spending cut that is sufficiently 
large and believed to be persistent can signal a future reduction in the tax burden, and therefore an increase in 
permanent disposable income (A point first made in Feldstein, 1982). But even small changes in public spending 
could produce large changes in private consumption in the opposite direction if they signal a change in regime or are 
sufficient  to  bring  the  economy  over  a  critical  threshold.,  as  in  the  model  of  Bertola  and  Drazen  (1993).  See 
Giavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano (2000) for a review of various model that produce these results.   5 
outcome of a consolidation is more likely to be expansionary when public debt is high or growing 
rapidly, but De Mello et al. (2004), as mentioned above, report findings that are more consistent 
with the results shown in GJP.  
 
Finally, the presence of credit market imperfections constraining household borrowing may 
also  affect  the  non-monotonic  response  of  saving  and  consumption  to  fiscal  policy.  A  non-
monotonic response of private consumption and saving to a large and persistent fiscal contraction 
requires well-functioning household credit markets. Consider the case of a large increases in net 
taxes that leads households to update the estimate of their permanent income: if the household is 
prevented from borrowing against the expectation of higher future income, it will be unable to 
increase its actual spending. Ferraro (2005) tests whether the non-monotonic response of national 
saving depends on the ease with which households can tap on financial markets and borrow. He 
splits the sample in two, distinguishing countries based the maximum “loan-to-value ratio” - the 
ratio between the maximum mortgage loan that a typical household could obtain, and the value of 
the house for which the loan was extended (reported in Table I of Jappelli and Pagano, 1994). He 
finds that non-monotonic effects are more likely to arise in countries characterized by a relatively 
high loan-to-value ratio, and are smaller and less precisely estimated in countries with a relatively 
lower loan-to-value ratio. This accords with the prediction that the functioning of the market for 
household  credit  affects  the  presence  and  magnitude  of  the  non-monotonic  effects  of  fiscal 
policy. 
 
Summarizing,  while  episodes  of  contractionary  fiscal  expansions,  and  expansionary 
contractions, are a rather common finding, there is still disagreement on the conditions under 
which a fiscal consolidation can raise output growth — or a fiscal expansion reduce it — and on 
the channels through which such effects might occur. Understanding these issues is obviously 
essential if one wishes to know which policies might improve the likelihood of a non-Keynesian 
outcomes. One purpose of the present paper is to test the robustness of the findings which suggest 
that a prerequisite for such non-Keynesian outcomes is the magnitude and persistence of the 




3. A first look at the data  
 
We  start  with  a  visual  impression  of  our  data.  Figure  1  plots  the  distribution  of  the  first 
differences  in  the  full-employment  government  surplus  scaled  by  full-employment  output. 
Positive numbers correspond to fiscal contractions, negative numbers to fiscal expansions. The 
sample and OECD countries considered are reported in the Appendix. 
 
Most fiscal impulses — from one year to the next — are relatively small: contractions and 
expansions that do not exceed 1.5 per cent of potential output. But there are many episodes 
outside this range, particularly in the case fiscal expansions, and some contractions are as large as 
5 per cent of potential output in a single year. 
   6 
Our definition of a “large and persistent” fiscal impulse uses a subset of the episodes in the 
tails of the distribution reported in Figure 1: those that lie outside the –1.5/+1.5 range, and among 
them  only  those  where  a  change  of  at  least  that  magnitude  has  occurred  for  at  least  two 
subsequent years. This gives us 73 episodes of “large and persistent” fiscal contraction and 55 
episodes of “large and persistent” fiscal expansion. The individual episodes are reported in the 
Appendix. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
How were these “large and persistent” contractions and expansions implemented? By acting 
on revenues, government consumption or public investment? Table 1 compares the growth rate of 
net  taxes  (taxes  net  of  government  transfers),  of  government  consumption  and  of  public 
investment  (each  defined  as  a  fraction  of  potential  output)  in  years  characterized  by  large 
contractions and large expansions, relative to normal times. 
 
Fiscal expansions are typically driven by large reduction in taxes (relative to normal times) 
and by some growth in expenditure, both investment and consumption (also relative to normal 
times). But tax cuts account for the lion’s share in a fiscal expansion. Instead, when governments 
slash the budget, they mostly do it by cutting public investment. During a typical contraction the 
growth rate of public investment, as a share of potential output, is 4 percentage points lower than 
in normal times. Net taxes increase during a contraction and government consumption falls, but 
by a much smaller amount than public investment. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure  2  plots  the  change  in  gross  national  saving  during  episodes  of  “large  and 
persistent”  fiscal  contraction  (in  the  upper  panel)  and  expansion  (in  the  lower  panel).  The 
“normal” situation would be one in which a fiscal contraction raises national saving, and a fiscal 
expansion  reduces  it.  Figure  2  shows  that  in  the  majority  of  episodes  national  savings  is 
unaffected by  the change in fiscal policy, indicating that private saving offset the change in 
public saving one for one. But there are observations on both tails. 
 
During episodes of large fiscal contraction (the upper panel), although the instances in 
which the fiscal contraction raises national savings (along the right-hand tail) are relatively more 
frequent, there is some mass in the left-hand tail, indicating episodes in which the offset is more 
than one for one. Symmetrically, during episodes of large fiscal expansion (the lower panel) there 
is some mass in the right-hand tail, which correspond to episodes where the private sector offset 
was  more  than  complete–although  once  again  most  of  the  fiscal  expansions  appear  to  lower 
national  saving  (the  left  tail).  The  bottom  line  is  that  the  “normal”  response  to  large  fiscal 
impulses appears prima facie more frequent in the data, but there are also instances of non-
monotonic responses. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
   7 
4. Empirical results  
 
We estimate, as in GJP, the following reduced-form equation, whose dependent variable is the 
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 the output gap, rt the real interest rate, T/Y* net taxes 
(taxes  net  of  government  transfers)  as  a  fraction  of  potential  output  and  G/Y*  government 
purchases, also as a fraction of potential output.4 
 
The variable dt is a dummy designed to capture the conditions that may give rise to a non-
monotonic response of national saving to fiscal impulses. Since we want to discriminate across 
various conditions that may trigger such non-monotonic response, our specifications include a set 
of such dummies, each corresponding to one such condition, rather than a single dummy.  One 
dummy variable is set equal to 1 during years characterized by a “large and persistent” fiscal 
impulse (as in GJP), and 0 otherwise. A second dummy is equal to 1 only if the growth rate of the 
ratio  of  (cyclically  adjusted)  gross  public  debt  to  trend  GDP  exceeds  4  percent  for  two 
consecutive years (as in Perotti, 1999). A third dummy is 1 only if the change in the spread 
between the yield on long-term government bonds denominated in domestic currency and the 
yield on U.S. 10-year Treasuries exceeds the sample mean by more than 1.5 standard deviations. 
Note that each dummy dt enters equation (1) both interacted with the two fiscal variables and by 
itself, to make sure that the interacted variable only captures the effect of the interaction rather 
than a possible independent effect of the dummy on national saving.  
 
In equation (1), the lagged value of the national saving rate is expected to capture the 
dynamics of the dependent variable,
5 while the output gap should reflect the response of private 
saving and of the government surplus to transitory changes in income. The (ex post) real interest 
rate is the difference between the domestic short term nominal rate and inflation, based on the 
                                                 
3 One advantage of using the national saving as dependent variable is that it does not depend on the particular 
definition used for private saving. De Mello et al. (2004) find that the estimated offset of private saving depends on 
the  definition  used.  For  instance,  they  find  lower  offset  coefficients  when  using  household,  rather  than  private 
saving. The finding however is sensitive to the elimination of outliers, suggesting that measurement errors may be 
particularly pronounced. Measurement problems are due to the difficulty in accurately demarcating the household 
and  corporate  sectors,  given  extensive  household  ownership  of  businesses  via  equity  and  mutual/pension  fund 
participation. These problems are avoided using national saving as the dependent variable. Furthermore, national 
saving is not affected by the redistribution between private and public saving that is induced by the effect of inflation 
on the public debt. 
4 We scale national saving and fiscal variables by potential output to avoid problems of heteroskedasticity. Dividing 
by actual rather than potential output would introduce an endogeneity bias due to the correlation between the error 
term and the right-hand-side variables. 
5  Equation  (1)  only  allows  for  very  simple  dynamics  of  national  saving.  De  Mello  et  al.  (2004)  use  an  error 
correction model and allow for more complex dynamics in the adjustment towards the long-term equilibrium.   8 
private consumption deflator. It is introduced to control for the direct effect on saving of changes 
in wealth induced by monetary policy. Since the interest rate is potentially endogenous, we use 
its lagged value as instrument.
 
 
Finally, following the specification in GJP, all regressions include a full set of country 
fixed effects, to account for the possibility that the response of national saving to a fiscal impulse 
might  depend  on  the  particular  characteristics  of  a  country,  such  as  its  size  and  degree  of 
openness to trade. Understanding the effects of fiscal policy maybe be easier in a small country, 
and indeed some of the famous episodes of  “non-Keynesian” effects have occurred in small 
countries, such as Ireland and Denmark. Countries that trade more, either in goods or in assets, 
may be more subject to capital market “discipline”, in the sense that it may be easier for saving to 
fly out of the country when fiscal policy looks “bad”.  
 
One problem in estimating equation (1) is the potential endogeneity of the fiscal variables. 
Such endogeneity may arise from two different sources. Because of the automatic stabilizers built 
in the existing tax code, tax revenues and government transfers from and to the economy (which 
enter our definition of T) fluctuate with the business cycle, and are thus affected by the same 
shocks which affect national savings.
6 We deal with this first source of endogeneity by using the 
full-employment government surplus net of interest payments, as estimated by the OECD, as 
instrument for net taxes.  
 
A second potential source of endogeneity arises from the possibility that the country’s 
fiscal rules themselves respond to the business cycle, which in standard models is positively 
correlated  with  national  saving.  Our  instrumental  variables  procedure  does  not  handle  this 
potential bias; GJP further discuss how the bias might affect the coefficient estimates.
7 
 
Our data are an unbalanced panel of OECD countries. The sample used in the estimation 
and the variables’ definitions are reported in the Appendix. For each regression we report results 
for three sample periods. “Up to 1996” defines the sample that is closest to our earlier results and 
thus comparable with the regressions reported in GJP, although several series have been revised. 
The other two samples – “Up to 2000” and “Up to 2003” – extend our previous results to the 
more recent period. 
 
 
4.1. The effect of fiscal policy during large and persistent fiscal episodes 
 
We start by estimating a benchmark specification where we do not interact the fiscal variables 
with the dummy d, so that the effects of G/Y* and T/Y* are constrained to be linear. Which signs 
                                                 
6  Government  consumption,  on  the  contrary,  is  unlikely  to  fluctuate  systematically  with  the  business  cycle: 
fluctuations  in  unemployment,  for  instance,  affect  government  transfers,  but  are  unlikely  to  be  correlated  with 
government purchases of goods and services. 
7 There have been a few attempts at constructing measures of exogenous fiscal policy shocks that are not based on 
the full-employment surplus. Blanchard and Perotti (1999) identify tax and spending shocks in U.S. quarterly data by 
assuming  that  implementing  fiscal  policy  changes  requires  at  least  one  quarter  and  by  relying  on  historical 
information on large discretionary changes in fiscal policy (such as the tax cut in the second quarter of 1975).   9 
should we expect on the coefficients of the fiscal variables? Finite horizon models suggest that an 
increase in net taxes should raise national saving (￿1>0), whereas an increase in government 
consumption should reduce it (￿1<0). In the benchmark infinite horizon model with lump-sum 
taxes,  taxes  have  no  effect  on  national  saving  (￿1=0):  this  is  the  Ricardian  equivalence 
proposition.  Also,  in  the  infinite  horizon  model,  for  a  given  path  of  pre-tax  income,  Y, 




The results are in Table 2. Column (1) uses the sample that is closer to that originally used 
in GJP; columns (2) and (3) update the sample to 2000 and 2003, respectively. The coefficient of 
T/Y* is positive and statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level in each regression. 
When  we  extend  the  sample  to  2003  the  point  estimate  becomes  smaller,  but  so  does  the 
coefficient of the lagged national saving, so that the long run effect of taxes - estimated as ￿1/(1- 
￿1) - is similar in columns 1 and 3 (0.51 and 0.53 respectively). 
 
Thus, when we constrain the effect of net taxes to be linear (￿2=0), the results run against 
the infinite horizon model and are consistent with the predictions of finite horizon models.   
 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The  coefficient  of G/Y* is  negative  and  also  statistically  different  from  zero  at  the  1 
percent level in both regressions. Contrary to the predictions of infinite horizon models with non-
distortionary taxes, the fall in private consumption does not fully compensate the increase in 
government consumption, thereby reducing national saving. In this case too the point estimate 
becomes smaller (in absolute value) when we extend the sample to 2003, but, as in the case of net 
taxes, the long-run response is similar. 
 
The results in Table 2, however, are potentially biased because by omitting the interaction 
terms  they  impose  that  the  response  of  national  saving  to  fiscal  variables  is  linear.  Table  3 
investigates this issue and contains the main results of the paper. Each of the three regressions 
reported in Table 3 tests the hypothesis that fiscal policy coefficients are stable during periods of 
protracted and sizable fiscal impulse or during periods of rapid debt growth. Our hypothesis 
(supported  by  our  previous  findings)  is  that  non-monotonic  responses  mostly  appear  during 
episodes of protracted and sizable fiscal impulse, as defined above. 
 
Consider first the sample up to 1996. In this sample (column 1) the effect of both T/Y*
 
and 
G/Y* is highly non-monotonic. During “normal” times, the effect of net taxes on national saving 
is positive (￿1 = 0.684), but during sharp shifts in fiscal policy the response of private saving 
virtually cancels any effect of public saving on national saving: ￿1+ ￿2= 0.684 – 0.665 = 0.019, 
and we cannot reject the hypothesis that ￿1+ ￿2 =0 (the p-value of the F-test is 0.88). The same 
happens for fiscal impulses induced by changes in G/Y*. During “normal” times, an increase in 
                                                 
8 Recall that national saving is the difference between national income and total consumption (private plus public): S 
= SG + SP = (T-G) + (Y -T -C) = Y - (C+G).   10 
government spending reduces national saving (￿1 = – 1.060) but during sharp shifts in fiscal 
policy the response of private saving greatly dampens the fall in national saving: ￿ 1+ ￿ 2= – 1.060 
+ 0.777 = – 0.283; in this case the offset is less than complete, as the hypothesis ￿ 1+ ￿ 2= 0 is 
rejected at the 5 percent confidence level (the p-value of the F-test is 0.027). 
 
National saving does not appear to respond differently to fiscal impulses carried out by 
changing government consumption or net taxes: what matters is the size of the impulse, not its 
composition. When we tried to split the “net taxes” variable into “direct plus indirect taxes” and 
“transfers” the two coefficients were less precisely estimated, but the results suggest that most of 
the action in the “net tax” variables comes from shifts in transfers, confirming one of the findings 
in Alesina and Ardagna (1998) — namely that what appears to matter most are changes in social 
security rules. 
 
On the contrary, and confirming the findings in GJP, the coefficient of the dummy for 
rapid  debt  growth,  interacted  with  net  taxes  or  government  consumption,  is  not  statistically 
different from zero, suggesting that a non-monotonic response of fiscal policy is more likely to 
arise when the cyclically adjusted surplus changes significantly, rather then when public debt 
grows rapidly. 
 
Columns (2) and (3), where we extend the sample to 2000 and 2003, respectively, show 
that the general pattern of these results survives to the more recent data. The evidence confirms 
the full offset of the tax coefficient during large fiscal episodes. In the more recent samples, 
contrary to the earlier one, we no longer reject the hypothesis of a full offset of the effect of 
government consumption during large fiscal episodes. Finally, the result that rapid debt growth is 
not a condition giving rise to a non-monotonic effect of fiscal impulses is confirmed: in none of 
these  regressions  are  the  interacted  coefficients  with  the  dummy  for  rapid  debt  statistically 
different from zero.  
 
 
4.2. Are the effects of large contractions different from those of large expansions? 
 
The  private  sector’s  response  to  a  fiscal  impulse  could  differ  depending  on  the  sign  of  the 
impulse. To test for the possibility of asymmetric behavior, we interact T/Y
* and G/Y
* with two 
separate dummies, one for large fiscal expansions and one for large fiscal contractions (the two 
dummies are then also entered separately). In each regression we keep the dummy for rapid debt 
growth interacted with net taxes or government consumption. The results in Table 4 report again 
estimates for three samples. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In column 1 (up to 1996), during episodes of large swings in fiscal policy, private saving 
consistently offsets the effects of changes in public saving, independently of whether the fiscal 
impulse is an expansion or a contraction. During contractions induced by an increase in taxes the 
offset is complete, as we do not reject the hypothesis that taxes do not effect national saving: the   11 
sum between the tax coefficients (0.640 – 0.723 = -0.083) is not statistically different from zero 
(the p-value of the test is 0.68). In case of fiscal expansions the point estimate of the sum of the 
tax  coefficients  is  also  close  to  zero  and,  again,  we  don’t  reject  the  hypothesis  that  during 
expansions the difference between the tax  coefficients (0.640 – 0.630 = 0.010) is not statistically 
different  from  zero  (the  p-value  of  the  test  is  0.94).  These  results  confirm  the  original  GJP 
findings with the updated series. 
 
During fiscal impulses induced by a change in government spending we find complete 
offset  during  large  contractions:  the  sum  of  the  two  coefficients  on  government  spending  (–
10.71+0.853=–0.218) is not statistically different from zero. On the other hand, in the case of 
expansions induced by large increases in government spending, the offset is less than complete: 
the sum of the coefficients (–1.071+0.731=–0.340) is statistically different from zero (the p-value 
of the test is 0.033). 
 
Also when the sample is extended to 2000 and 2003 (columns 2 and 3) we find that the 
response of national saving to large fiscal impulses is non-monotonic and symmetric for large 
expansions and large contractions. In the case of fiscal impulses induced by large changes in net 
taxes the offset is complete both in the case of expansions and contractions; in the case of fiscal 
impulses induced by large changes in government spending the offset is complete in the case of 
fiscal contractions and, in the sample extending to 2003, also in the case of fiscal expansions. 
 
Finally, in this specification too the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that “rapid 




4.3. Interest rate spreads 
 
For spending cuts or tax increases to produce a fall in private saving (and viceversa) either the 
market value of non-human wealth must rise, or households must anticipate a higher permanent 
income. This could happen if fiscal impulses affected households’ expectations. For instance, a 
spending  cut  that  is  sufficiently  large  and  (believed  to  be)  persistent  could  signal  a  future 
reduction in the tax burden, and therefore an increase in permanent disposable income (Feldstein, 
1982). 
 
Could there be other circumstances under which a fiscal impulse could induce a change in 
households’  estimate  of  their  permanent  disposable  income?  One  possibility  (discussed  in 
Blanchard, 1990) is that the response of consumers to fiscal impulses may differ depending on 
the perceived sustainability of the fiscal regime. For instance, when the debt-income ratio is 
growing rapidly, a fiscal contraction may provide the signal that a debt default will be avoided: it 
this may induce a large revision in permanent disposable income. 
 
The results in Tables 3 and 4 have shown that a rapidly growing debt-GDP ratio is not per 
se a condition for the response of national saving to fiscal impulses to be non-monotonic. One   12 
possibility is that consumers become concerned about rapid debt growth only when this starts 
inducing the risk of a default, in other words only when interest rate spreads start widening. 
 
In the regressions reported in Table 5 we allow for the possibility that the response of 
national  saving  to  fiscal  impulses  becomes  non-monotonic  when  the  change  in  the  spread 
between the yield on long-term government bonds denominated in domestic currency and the 
yield on U.S. 10-year Treasuries. Such yields reflect either expectations of currency depreciation 
or  default  premia:  when  the  yield  widens  it  thus  signals  that  the  markets  is  becoming  more 
concerned  about  fiscal  sustainability.
9  In  this  case,  our  specification  includes  an  additional 
dummy  that  equals  1  when  the  spread  exceeds  the  sample  mean  by  more  than  1.5  standard 
deviations,  and  0  otherwise.  The  specifications  also  include  the  dummies  that  were  already 
present in the regressions of Table 3, and therefore still allow for non-monotonic responses to be 
associated with the size and persistence of fiscal impulses and debt growth.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The results in Table 5 tend to confirm that the circumstance most likely to give rise to an 
offsetting response of private saving remains the size and persistence of the fiscal impulse. The 
offset coefficients, however, are much less precisely estimated, possibly because of collinearity 
between the dummy for rapid debt growth and the dummy for the widening of spreads. The 
dummies set equal to 1 when debt is growing rapidly and when spreads widen are not statistically 
different from zero. Distinguishing between expansions and contractions (as in Table 4) does not 
change the results.  
 
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Data revisions and the availability of a longer sample offer the opportunity to reconsider the 
empirical findings which suggest that in the OECD countries the response of national savings to 
fiscal policy is non-monotonic. Our main results can be summarized as follows. 
 
Before  considering  the  possibility  of  a  non-monotonic  response  —  that  is  when  we 
constrain the effect of net taxes to be linear — we find, contrary to the predictions of infinite 
horizon models with non-distortionary taxes, that an increase in taxes raises national saving, and 
that an increase in government purchases lowers it.  
                                                 
9 Caballero and Krisnhamurty (2004) suggests a different reason why the effects of a fiscal expansion might depend 
on the response of bond prices. In countries characterized by relatively thin financial markets a fiscal expansion that 
is large enough to absorb significant amounts of liquidity will be accompanied by a sharp increase in interest rates 
and corresponding reductions in households’ financial wealth. Ardagna (2004) finds that stock market prices surge 
around times of substantial fiscal tightening and plunge in periods of very loose fiscal policy — and that such effects 
are  more  likely  to  occur  in  country-years  with  high  levels  of  government  deficit,  and  when  consolidations  are 
implemented by cutting government spending, and that generate a permanent and substantial decrease in government 
debt. 
   13 
The new data confirms that the circumstance most likely to give rise to a non-monotonic 
response of national saving to a fiscal impulse is a “large and persistent impulse”, defined as one 
in which the full employment surplus, as a percent of potential output, changes by at least 1.5 
percentage points per year over a two-year period. This particular circumstance remains the only 
statistically  significant  one  even  when  we  allow  for  non-monotonic  responses  to  arise  when 
public debt is growing rapidly or interest rate spreads are widening. 
 
We find that non-monotonic responses are similar for fiscal contractions and expansions. 
In  particular,  an  increase  in  net  taxes  has  no  effect  on  national  saving  during  large  fiscal 
contractions  or  expansions.  For  government  consumption  there  is  a  large,  albeit  in  some 
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Appendix: Definition of the variables used in the regressions 
 
All variables are drawn from the March 2005 OECD Economic Outlook database. Public sector data refer to general 
government. Definition of the variables and sample periods are as follows.  
 
Variables’ definition   Name of the corresponding OECD Series  
(Economic Outlook database)  
Private consumption   CP  
Government consumption   CG  
Government savings   SAVG  
Government debt   GGFL  
Gross National/Domestic Product   GDPV  
Deflator for consumer expenditure   PCP  
Taxes net of transfers   SAVG+CG  
Government investment   IG  
Social security contributions   SS  
Social security benefits   SSPG  
Full employment government surplus   NLQGA  
Potential output   GDPVTR  
 
Countries, sample period used in the estimation, and fiscal episodes 
 
Country  Sample 
used in the 
estimation 
Episodes of “large and persistent” 
fiscal expansion 
 
Episodes of “large and persistent” 
fiscal contraction 
Australia   71-03   74-76; 90-93; 00-01   71-72; 79-80; 85-88; 94-97  
Austria   73-03   82-83; 93-95   73-74; 84-85; 96-97; 00-02  
Belgium   72-03   78-80;    72-73; 81-87; 92-94  
Canada   70-03   74-78; 82-85; 00-03   70-71; 80-81; 86-88; 94-98  
Denmark   72-03   74-76; 81-82; 90-91; 94-95   72-73; 77-78; 83-87; 98-99  
Finland  77-03  79-80; 82-83; 86-87; 90-91; 01-03  77-78; 84-85; 88-89; 92-94; 98-00 
France   72-03   77-78; 81-82; 92-93; 02-03;   72-73; 79-80; 95-97  
Germany   70-03   74-75; 87-91; 00-02   69-70; 76-77; 81-83; 92-94  
Ireland   86-03   90-91; 00-02   80-84; 86-89; 93-94  
Italy   64-03   71-73; 78-81; 84-85;98-01   64-65; 76-77; 82-83; 90-93; 95-97  
Japan   71-03   75-76; 92-96; 98-00   71-72; 83-85  
Netherlands   80-03   86-90; 94-95; 01-02   80-83; 91-93; 96-97  
New Zealand   87-03   96-97   87-91  
Norway   79-03  89-92; 01-03   79-80; 82-83; 85-86; 93-96; 99-00  
Portugal   77-03   89-90; 93-94   77-78; 81-84; 91-92; 01-03  
Spain   80-03     80-81; 86-87; 91-92; 95-97  
Sweden   80-03   90-93; 01-03   80-84; 86-88; 94-98  
United Kingdom   71-01   83-84; 89-93; 01-04   71-72; 74-75; 79- 82; 95-99  
United States   66-03   70-71; 74-75; 82-83; 01-03   66-69; 76-77; 87-88; 93-98   17 
Table 1 
Taxes and spending during fiscal contractions and expansions, relative to normal times  
 
  Fiscal contractions  Fiscal expansions  
T/Y*   1.1 %   -5.9 %  
G/Y*   - 1.2 %   0.6 %  
I/Y*   - 4.0 %   0.6 %  
Average length of a fiscal episode   2.95 years   2.98 years  
Number of fiscal episodes   73   55  
 
Note. The table reports the yearly percent change in the ratios of taxes and spending to full employment 
output (T/Y* and G/Y*) and government investment (I/Y*) during episodes of “large and persistent” fiscal 
contractions and expansions. The numbers are deviation from mean growth rate in “normal times”. The 
sample period is 1970-2004. Countries included in the estimation and variables’ definitions are reported in 
the Appendix. 
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Table 2 
National saving, taxes and government spending: baseline specification 
  
  Up to 1996  Up to 2000  Up to 2003 
 
Lagged national saving rate  0.534  0.649  0.722 
  (0.036)***  (0.033)***  (0.029)*** 
Output gap  0.267  0.269  0.282 
  (0.039)***  (0.039)***  (0.035)*** 
Real interest rate  0.031  0.006  0.008 
  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.030) 
       
Net taxes (T/Y*)  0.241  0.206  0.152 
  (0.066)***  (0.054)***  (0.048)*** 
Government consumption (G/Y*)  -0.545  -0.380  -0.308 
  (0.059)***  (0.056)***  (0.052)*** 
       
Observations  425  501  556 
Adjusted R-squared  0.94  0.94  0.94 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of national saving to potential output. Instruments for net taxes and the real 
interest rate are the full-employment government surplus (scaled by potential output) and the lagged real interest rate. 
Countries included in the estimation and variables’ definitions are reported in the Appendix. All regressions are 
estimated  with  fixed  effects.  Standard  errors  are  reported  in  parenthesis.  One,  two  and  three  stars  indicate 
significance levels at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.  
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Table 3 
National savings, taxes and government spending: distinguishing between “normal times”,  
episodes of “large change in primary fiscal surplus” and episodes of “rapid debt growth” 
 
  Up to 1996  Up to 2000  Up to 2003 
 
Lagged national saving rate  0.576  0.660  0.737 
  (0.052)***  (0.042)***  (0.043)*** 
Output gap  0.213  0.246  0.268 
  (0.061)***  (0.047)***  (0.045)*** 
Real interest rate  0.042  -0.028  -0.036 
  (0.065)  (0.052)  (0.054) 
       
Net taxes (T/Y*)  0.684  0.547  0.527 
  (0.229)***  (0.170)***  (0.172)*** 
--- and large change in surplus  -0.665  -0.501  -0.534 
  (0.281)**  (0.228)**  (0.221)** 
---  and rapid debt growth  0.434  -0.177  -0.489 
  (0.574)  (0.511)  (0.608) 
       
Government consumption (G/Y*)  -1.060  -0.777  -0.739 
  (0.223)***  (0.185)***  (0.179)*** 
--- and large change in surplus  0.777  0.613  0.642 
  (0.289)***  (0.249)**  (0.241)*** 
--- and rapid debt growth  -0.348  0.177  0.447 
  (0.492)  (0.440)  (0.524) 
       
Dummy for large change in full employment surplus  -2.920  -2.694  -2.593 
  (1.073)***  (0.905)***  (0.906)*** 
Dummy for rapid debt growth  -1.051  -1.071  -1.092 
  (0.512)**  (0.439)**  (0.473)** 
       
Observations  425  501  556 
Adjusted R-squared  0.89  0.91  0.91 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of national saving to potential output. Instruments for net taxes and the real 
interest rate are the full-employment government surplus (scaled by potential output) and the lagged real interest rate. 
Countries included in the estimation and variables’ definitions are reported in the Appendix. All regressions are 
estimated with fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 4 
National savings, taxes and government spending: distinguishing between “normal times”,  
large fiscal contractions and large fiscal expansions 
 
 
  Up to 1996  Up to 2000  Up to 2003 
 
Lagged national saving rate  0.606  0.700  0.765 
  (0.066)***  (0.050)***  (0.042)*** 
Output gap  0.226  0.265  0.279 
  (0.067)***  (0.052)***  (0.045)*** 
Real interest rate  0.051  -0.013  -0.032 
  (0.068)  (0.055)  (0.050) 
       
Net taxes (T/Y*)  0.640  0.499  0.478 
  (0.237)***  (0.179)***  (0.158)*** 
-- and large increase in surplus  -0.723  -0.620  -0.559 
  (0.339)**  (0.294)**  (0.226)** 
-- and large decrease in surplus  -0.630  -0.472  -0.523 
  (0.290)**  (0.238)**  (0.219)** 
-- and rapid debt growth  0.620  0.204  -0.256 
  (0.620)  (0.560)  (0.546) 
       
Government consumption (G/Y*)  -1.071  -0.792  -0.697 
  (0.252)***  (0.213)***  (0.172)*** 
-- and large increase in surplus  0.853  0.785  0.700 
  (0.358)**  (0.334)**  (0.256)*** 
-- and large decrease in surplus  0.731  0.524  0.606 
  (0.297)**  (0.248)**  (0.236)** 
-- and rapid debt growth  -0.514  -0.166  0.237 
  (0.531)  (0.483)  (0.469) 
       
Dummy for large fiscal contraction  -3.250  -3.647  -3.076 
  (1.285)**  (1.267)***  (1.086)*** 
Dummy for large fiscal expansion  -2.813  -1.735  -2.366 
  (1.546)*  (1.213)  (1.156)** 
Dummy for rapid debt growth  -0.899  -0.820  -0.935 
  (0.547)  (0.476)*  (0.468)** 
       
Observations  425  501  556 
Adjusted R-squared  0.87  0.90  0.91 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of national saving to potential output. Instruments for net taxes and the real 
interest rate are the full-employment government surplus (scaled by potential output) and the lagged real interest rate. 
Countries included in the estimation and variables’ definitions are reported in the Appendix. All regressions are 
estimated with fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Table 5 
National savings during large fiscal episodes, when debt  
is growing fast and when spreads widen  
 
  Up to 1996  Up to 2000  Up to 2003 
 
Lagged national saving rate  0.562  0.641  0.740 
  (0.075)***  (0.054)***  (0.058)*** 
Output gap  0.257  0.277  0.296 
  (0.083)***  (0.061)***  (0.055)*** 
Real interest rate  0.032  -0.023  -0.025 
  (0.090)  (0.068)  (0.067) 
       
Net taxes (T/Y*)  0.648  0.549  0.516 
  (0.327)**  (0.245)**  (0.215)** 
-- and large change in surplus  -0.953  -0.721  -0.707 
  (0.665)  (0.516)  (0.411)* 
-- and rapid debt growth  0.482  -0.091  -0.395 
  (0.874)  (0.739)  (0.786) 
-- and large change in spread  1.011  0.756  0.645 
  (0.978)  (0.804)  (0.693) 
       
Government consumption (G/Y*)  -1.017  -0.787  -0.715 
  (0.344)***  (0.292)***  (0.227)*** 
-- and large change in surplus  1.083  0.861  0.845 
  (0.702)  (0.569)  (0.463)* 
-- and rapid debt growth  -0.423  0.080  0.347 
  (0.763)  (0.648)  (0.686) 
-- and large change in spread  -1.419  -1.129  -0.998 
  (1.213)  (1.029)  (0.916) 
       
Dummy for large change in full employment surplus  -3.422  -3.269  -3.205 
  (1.828)*  (1.532)**  (1.470)** 
Dummy for rapid debt growth  -1.794  -1.551  -1.487 
  (1.166)  (0.895)*  (0.832)* 
Dummy for large change in spread  7.564  7.026  6.792 
  (5.098)  (4.818)  (4.801) 
       
Observations  425  501  556 
Adjusted R-squared  0.77  0.85  0.87 
 
Note. The dependent variable is the ratio of national saving to potential output. Instruments for net taxes and the real 
interest rate are the full-employment government surplus (scaled by potential output) and the lagged real interest rate. 
Countries included in the estimation and variables’ definitions are reported in the Appendix. All regressions are 
estimated with fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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Figure 1 
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Change in full employment surplus
 
 
Note.  The  figures  plot  the  change  in  the  full-employment  budget  surplus  scaled  by  full-employment 
output. Countries included are reported in the Appendix.   23 
Figure 2 
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Change in national saving during large fiscal expansions
 
 
Note. The figures plot the change in gross national saving during periods of large fiscal contractions and 
expansions. Episodes of large contractions are defined as years in which the change in the ratio of full 
employment surplus to potential output is greater than 1.5 percent; large expansions are years in which the 
change in full employment surplus is lower than –1.5 percent. 
  